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ONE MAN'S TRASH IS ANOTHER MAN'S TREASURE,
BIOPROSPECTING: PROTECTING THE RIGHTS AND
INTERESTS OF HUMAN DONORS OF
GENETIC MATERIAL
Leaders of the publicly funded human genome project and the
private company, Celera Genomics of Rockville, Maryland, announced in February 2001 that the human genome has been mapped,
marking a significant achievement in the history of modern science
and medicine.' While researchers have already developed diagnostic
tests for several diseases of genetic origin, it is not far fetched to predict that it will soon be possible to test for or treat hundreds of devastating genetic diseases.2 The result: the biotechnology revolution has
become modern alchemy, aiming to transmute diseased biological
material into gold, and to find the panacea of human genetic illness.
Researchers are racing to advance scientific knowledge and cash in on
the enormous financial potential of their discoveries. Market forces
and scientific advances in genetic research have merged, creating an
uncomfortable tension between the goals and expectations of the
market (profit) on the one hand, and the goals and expectations of
science (freely shared knowledge) on the other.3
At the same time, the donors from whom is harvested the raw
material of these discoveries are not compensated for their contributions.4 This new "alchemy" raises urgent ethical and policy questions
concerning the rights and interests of those individuals who donate
their biological material to researchers who seek to develop useful diagnostic tests and successful treatments and to profit from their discoveries. The real profit and medical potential of raw human genetic
material, specifically diseased genetic material, injects important equity considerations into a discussion of how the financial and thera-

1. See Rick Weiss, Life's Blueprint in Less Than One Inch: Only a Small DNA Segment Makes
Human, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2001, at Al.
2. See Rick Weiss, A New Genetic Window on CuringDiseases,WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2001,
at A10. See generally Margaret Graham Tebo, The Big Gene Profit Machine, A.B.A.J.,
5 (Apr.
2001), available at http://www.abanet.org/journal/apr0l/fgene.html.
3. See generally Sheldon Krimsky, The Profit of Scientific Discovery and Its Normative Implications, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 15 (1999); see also Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human
Tissues, 86 VA. L. REv. 163 (2000). See Tebo, supra note 2, at 27-38.
4. See generally Gina Kolata, Sharing Profits Is Debated As the Value of Tissue Rises, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 2000, at Al; see also Justin Gillis, Gene Research Success Spurs Profit Debate,
WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2000, at Al.
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peutic benefits derived from successful research should be
apportioned.
The case of Dan and Debbie Greenberg provides significant insight into the issues raised by the development of successful diagnostic
testing for genetic diseases.5 The Greenbergs had two children afflicted by Canavan disease, a rare but fatal genetic disorder.6 They
sought out and convinced Dr. Reuben Matalon to research Canavan
disease; they raised money for his research, provided him with tissue
samples from their afflicted children, and found other families to participate in the research. 7 The Greenbergs were shocked when Miami
Children's Hospital, the institution supporting Dr. Matalon's laboratory, was awarded a patent for his successful Canavan research, and
then began restricting use of the diagnostic test and charging a fee.8
In October 2000, the Greenbergs,joined by several other families who
had contributed tissues from diseased children to Dr. Matalon's research, filed suit against Miami Children's Hospital for breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent concealment, conversion, misappropriation of
9
trade secrets, unjust enrichment, and breach of informed consent.
I argue that the interests and rights of individual donors of genetic material and the aggregate community of donors need to be
protected. In addition, donors are entitled to a share in the fruits of
successful research. These fruits include: access to diagnostic tests and
useful treatment, public and legal acknowledgement of their contribution, and the rights to control that preserve the best interest of the
other patients similarly situated or the public, and profit. Apportioning the fruits of genetic research is a formidable challenge, but it is
imperative that we attempt to address these issues.
This paper consists of four parts. Part I provides an elementary
explanation of genetic disease as it relates to the Greenberg case. Part
II examines the Constitutional and statutory authority for our patent
system. Part III explores the legal basis for patient rights in the Greenberg case. Part IV analyzes the effects of genetic patents and their
profit potential on donors of the biological material necessary for research and discovery. This section of the paper begins by raising questions about whether genetic compounds should be patentable.
Conceding that the current law allows these patents, the paper goes
5. See supra note 4.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See generally Petitioner's Opening Brief, Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital
and Reuben Matalon, No. OOC 6779 (D. Ill. filed Oct. 30, 2000).
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on to assess ways to protect donors' rights and interests through informed consent, apportioning the benefits of successful genetic research, and creating patient advocacy groups.
I.

A

PRIMER ON GENETIC DISEASE

Genetic diseases result from genetic mutations. In addition,
sometimes genetic factors will combine with environmental factors to
produce genetic disease. 1 ° Before scientists knew anything about
gene mapping, genetic diseases were recognized through family histories of certain diseases. Today, many genetic diseases can be identified from a sequence alteration in the map of one or more genes.1 '
Genetic diseases are complex. Their diagnosis is complicated by a
number of factors which results in clinical heterogeneity, that is, there
is variability in the expression of a particular disease among those affected. 12 Different mutations in different genes can cause an identical
or similar phenotype.'" These complexities lead to varying levels of
uncertainty underlying diagnosis and prognosis derived from genetic
14
testing.
Populations that have remained somewhat isolated and that share
the same ancestors are relatively homogeneous genetically. 5 This homogeneity assists researchers with the difficult task of identifying a
10. See generally Monique K. Mansoura & Francis S. Collins, Medical Implications of the
Genetic Revolution, 1 J. HEALTH CAPE L. & POL'Y 329 (1998).
11. See id. at 334. For example, currently predictive genetic tests are available for disease such as sickle-cell anemia, cystic fibrosis, achondroplasia, Down syndrome, Huntington disease, Tay Sachs, colon cancer, obesity, and some forms of breast cancer. See id. at
332, 334, 340.
12. See id. at 335.
13. See id. at 336.
14. See id. at 336-42. Clinical heterogeneity can be classified into two major categories:
1) allelic heterogeneity, referring to different mutations at one locus or gene, and 2) locus
heterogeneity, referring to the fact that for many diseases, more than one gene can be
involved in disease onset. Another concept fundamental to predictive genetic testing is
penetrance.See id. This concept is an all or none phenomenon that refers to clinical expression, or lack of it, of mutant genes. See id. It addresses the likelihood that a given sequence
alteration will actually result in disease. See id.
15. See ALICE WEXLER, MAPPING FATE: A MEMOIR OF FAMILY, RISK, AND GENETIC RESEARCH 182-210 (1995) (stating that in the early 1980's, researchers began studying inhabitants in the Lake Maracaibo region of Venezuela. These inhabitants were found to have a
high occurrence of Huntington's disease and because of the founders effect, this community became invaluable to researchers in its search for the gene responsible for Huntington's.); see also Eliot Marshall, Whose DNA Is It Anyway?, 278 SCIENCE, Oct. 24, 1997, at
564-67 (providing researchers' hope that a tightly knit group of islanders who suffer a
high incidence of asthma and who settled on Tristan de Cunha in the south Atlantic over
2000 years ago will provide valuable genetic information concerning the asthma gene.)
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The "founders effect" describes a popula-

tion or community of people, descended from a single ancestor or a
small group of ancestors, in which any expression of a genetic disease
would stem from the same original genes, located at the same spot on
the same chromosome. 7 For instance, AshkenaziJews (Jews who trace
their origins to Central and Eastern European descent) exhibit the
founder's effect. This population has remained relatively isolated in
their genetic ancestry, and therefore genetic mutations are easier to

identify than in members of the general population. Ashkenazi Jews
make up 90% of the more than six million Jews in the United States."8
In the case of the Canavan gene, one in 33 people of Ashkenazi heritage islikely to be a carrier.1 " If both parents are carriers, a couple has
a 25% chance of producing a baby with the disease.2z
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

BASIS

FOR PATENTS

The next section of this paper offers a cursory glimpse at the
complicated area of patent law and considers how patents affects the
rights and interests of donors of genetic material.
Patent law derives from Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
United States Constitution, which grants Congress the power to legislate to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discourse." 21 Current statutory authority defining what is patentable comes from Title 35 of the United
States Code, section 101, which provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefore, subject to the requirements of this title. 22
The statute requires that the invention be novel.23 In addition, the
invention must be non-obvious: "A patent may not be obtained... if
.the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time

16. See WEXLER supra note 15.
17. See WEXLER supra note 15, at 189-90.
18. See Steven Greenhouse, Doctor's Urge Screeningfor Disorder,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1999,
at F6; see also Robert Lipsyte, A Postcardfrom Morgan's Twlight World, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,
1996, Sec. 13, 1.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See supra note 18.
See id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1984).
See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1984).
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the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains. 24
Patent seekers must meet a three part "utility" test in determining
whether the item for which they seek a patent is "useful."25 They must
show: 1) specific utility (usefulness must be specific to the subject
matter claimed); 2) substantial utility (patent seeker must define a
"real world" use); and 3) credible utility (the utility of the subject matter must be well-established) .26
Our founding fathers developed patents as an incentive system
for inventors to innovate and ultimately reveal their discoveries. 27 Patent rights are exclusionary rights and not ownership rights. 28 In ex-

change for making their inventions public, inventors receive the right
to exclude the public from using their invention, as well as control use
of their invention for a term of twenty years. 29 Control is managed
through a system of licensing and fees.3 °
Congress intended the patent statute to include "anything under
the sun that is made by man. 13 ' This did not mean there were no
limits on statutory subject matter. The Patent and Trademark Office
determines what is patentable, and its decisions must withstand the
scrutiny of the courts. For instance, one who discovers a previously
unknown law of nature, a physical phenomenon, or an abstract idea
has no legal claim to a monopoly. 3 2 A newly discovered mineral or a
new plant found in the wild is not patentable.3 3 Likewise, "Einstein
could not have patented the natural law of E = mc 2 and Newton could
not have patented the law of gravity. ''3 These examples are part of

24. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1984).
25. Stephen Walsh, Associate Solicitor, U.S. Department of Commerce, Patent and
Trademark Office, Address at a forum, Patentability of Gene Sequences, at the University of
Maryland School of Law (Apr. 5, 2001).
26. See id.
27. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
28. See35 U.S.C. § 1

54

(a)(1) (1984).

29. See id.
30. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (1984) (providing that "such grant shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which
the application for the patent was filed in the United States or, if the application contains a
specific reference to an earlier filed application or applications under section 120, 121, or
365(c) of this title, from the date on which the earliest such application was filed.").
31. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (citing Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Patent Act).
32. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
33. See id.
34. Id.
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the storehouse of knowledge of all men, and therefore not
patentable.3 5
As a fundamental matter, there are strong arguments supporting
the contention that genetic materials should not be and, in fact, are
not patentable. Sir Isaac Newton once said, "if I have seen farther
than other men, it is because I stood on the shoulders of giants."3 6
Essentially, one could assert that scientific knowledge is cumulative
and that an isolated genetic disease marker is a "product of nature."
But because the patent regime is a complicated area of law and because genetics is a complex science, I will advance my argument concerning the rights and interests of individuals within the existing
framework of today's patent regime. 7 Modern courts have upheld
patents on genetic probes, or cloned gene sequences that identify certain characteristics or disease.38
III.

INFORMED CONSENT, CONVERSION, CONCEPTION, AND THE

GREENBERG CASE

In 1990, the Supreme Court of California decided the important
case of Moore v. Regents of California,which held that physicians have a
fiduciary duty to inform patients of any personal interest, including
research or economic, that is unrelated to the patient's health.3 9 This
case will be influential in the Greenberg case against Miami Children's Hospital, as the issues of the two cases are parallel. In Moore,
the plaintiff, John Moore, underwent treatment for hairy-cell leukemia at the Medical Center of the University of California at Los Angeles.4 ° The plaintiffs physician took blood, bone marrow aspirate, and
other tissue samples for diagnostic purposes.4 1 In addition, the physician recommended the removal of the plaintiffs spleen as part of a
treatment plan. 42 The plaintiff conceded that the defendants had disclosed "they were engaged in strictly academic and purely scientific
medical research"; however he claimed that the defendants had dis35. See id.

36. Arti Kaur Rai, RegulatingScientificResearch:Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of
Science, 94 Nw. U.L. REv. 77, 90 (1999) (explaining the scientific norm that promotes sharing information, in which the equity of the individual scientist is limited to professional
recognition and esteem).
37. See infra notes 91-146 and accompanying text.
38. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (1984); Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Amgen v. Chugai Pharmaceuticals, 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed.
Cir 1991).
39. See Moore v. Regents of California, 51 Cal.3d 120 (Cal. 1990).
40. See id. at 125-26.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 126.
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avowed any financial interest in the research. 4" During the course of
the plaintiffs treatment and without his knowledge, the defendants
established, then patented a cell line from the cells taken from the
plaintiffs spleen and other body tissue samples." The plaintiff
claimed breach of fiduciary duty and informed consent, as well as
conversion.

A.

Informed Consent

The doctrine of informed consent developed out of a strong judicial deference toward individual autonomy. Essentially, it holds that
an individual has a right to be free from nonconsensual interference
with his or her person.4 5 In addition, the doctrine functions to protect a patient's status as a human being, avoid fraud and duress, encourage physicians to weigh decisions carefully, foster rational
decision making in a patient, and involve the public in medicine.4 6
Traditionally, before providing any kind of treatment a physician must
disclose to the patient the diagnosis, the nature and purpose of a proposed treatment, the risks of treatment and non-treatment, and the
alternatives to the proposed treatment.4" In some jurisdictions, the
scope of the duty to disclose is measured by the knowledge a reasonable patient needs to make an informed choice. In other words, all
information material to a patient's decision should be given.4" In
other jurisdictions, the scope of the duty is measured by a reasonable
49
medical practitioner, similarly situated.
The court in Moore v. Regents expanded the physician's duty to
include a fiduciary duty to disclose information that is material to a
patient's decision.5" The court examined the principles of informed
consent: A person of adult years and in sound mind has the right to
determine whether or not to submit to lawful medical treatment. 5 1
Further, "[i] n soliciting informed consent, a physician has a fiduciary
5 2
duty to disclose all information material to the patient's decision. 1
43. Id. at 132, (citing Moore's allegations that his doctor "concealed an economic interest in the postoperative procedures."
44. See id. at 127.
45. BARRY R. FURROWS ET AL., HEALTH LAW CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 397 (3d

ed. 1987).
46. See
47. See
48. See
49. See
50. See
51. See
52. Id.

id.
id at 107-08.
id. at 429 (citing Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal.3d 285 (Cal. 1980)).
id. at 406.
Moore, 51 Cal.3d at 129.
id. (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.3d 229, 242 (Cal. 1972)).
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The court observed that there are conflicting interests a physician
must balance when she both treats and maintains a research interest
in a patient. 53 Any interests extraneous to the health of a patient that
may affect a physician's judgment are material, and a reasonable patient would likely want to know of those interests before consenting to
a proposed course of treatment. 54 Ultimately, the court held, "[a]
physician who is seeking a patient's consent for a medical procedure
must, in order to satisfy his fiduciary duty and obtain the informed
consent, disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient's health,
whether research or economic, that may affect his medical
judgment.

55

B.

Conversion

The plaintiff in Moore also asserted that the defendants interfered
with his ownership interest in the cells that were removed from his

body, and that he had a proprietary interest in the products created
from his cells.5 6 After balancing relevant policy considerations, the
court declined to extend the tort of conversion to cases such as the
one at bar, concluding that patients are sufficiently protected by the

informed consent doctrine.5 In its analysis, the court observed that
there was no precedent for extending conversion liability to the use of
human cells in medical research. 58 In addition, existing statutory laws
limit patients' continuing interest in their excised cells. 59 Human
tissue, transplantable organs, blood, fetuses, corneal tissue, dead bodies, and other human biological materials are considered by the law as
sui generis- their disposition is regulated in deference to public policy
consideration, rather than "abandoning them to the general law -of
personal property."6 And lastly, the court held that the plaintiff had
no possessory claim over the patented cell line because it "is factually
and legally distinct from plaintiffs cell line."6 1

Another important policy consideration precluded the court
from extending the tort of conversion to excised human cells. The
court stated that innocent parties, such as medical researchers, who
53. See id. at 130.
54. See id.
55. See Moore v. Regents of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120 at 131-32 (Cal. 1990). Certain
personal interests may effect a physician's professional judgement. See id. at 132, n.10.
56. See id. at 134.
57. See id. at 142.
58. See id. at 137.
59. See generally Ann. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 7150 - 7158 (1994).
60. Moore v. Regents of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 137 (Cal. 1990).
61. Id. at 142.
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engage in socially useful activities, should not be threatened with civil
liability. 62 Allowing a patient, who is a specimen source, a cause of

action in conversion could hinder research and product development
by restricting access to necessary raw material.6" The legislature, not
the court, should make the decision as to whether liability for conversion should be extended.6 4
C.

Conception

Courts have held that people cannot contract for things to which
they are not entitled. This is true in patent law, as is illustrated by the
following case, Brown v Regents of the University of California.6 5
In 1994, the court held in Brown v Regents of the University of California that patent law does not recognize the contributions of individuals
who provide the raw material for a patent.6 6 The plaintiff supplied
researchers with cats she suspected to have feline immunodeficiency
virus (F.I.V.), the feline form of human immunodeficiency virus
(H.I.V.). The court considered whether the plaintiff had made sufficient contribution to the "conception" that led to a patent award as to
67
be named a joint inventor.
The plaintiff, an animal health technician, had observed immunodeficiency symptoms in several of the cats in the shelter she maintained for them.6" She made detailed observations and records of the
cats' illnesses and had a veterinarian test them for a number of diseases, which turned up no diagnoses. 6" Ultimately, the plaintiff
brought the cats to the defendant, a well-known animal virologist and
told him she suspected that the cats suffered from a virus similar to
H.I.V. 70 The defendant did extensive laboratory work, which led to an

award of a patent on methods for identifying F.I.V. in a pure and nonnaturally occurring form, and of detecting F.I.V. in cats and immuniz71
ing them against it.

62. See id. at 143.
63. See id. at 144.
64. See id. at 145.
65. See 866 F.Supp. 439 (N. Dist. Cal. 1994); see also infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
66. See Brown, 866 F.Supp. at 440.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See Brown v. Regents of California, 866 F.Supp. 439 (N. Dist. Cal. 1994).
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The court found that the plaintiff, a "nonscientist," played no
role in the lab work involved in isolating the virus.7 2 Despite the value
of her research leads, the plaintiff did not contribute to the conception of the inventions covered by the patents held by the defendant.7 3
The court held that to qualify as a joint inventor, the plaintiff must
have contributed to the conception of the invention.7 4

D.

The Greenberg Case

In the early 1980's, Dan and Debbie Greenberg discovered that

two of their children were afflicted by a devastating genetic disorder,
Canavan disease.7 5 Canavan disease, which occurs most commonly in
Ashkenazi Jews, is a form of leukodystrophy, a rare degenerative neurological disease that is fatal, usually by the time affected children
reach their teens.7 6 Children born with Canavan disease have poor
vision and abnormally low muscle tone; they do not have normal motor coordination and will not learn to crawl, feed themselves, walk, or
talk.7 7 The way the Canavan genetic mutation works is by preventing
production of an enzyme needed to metabolize an acid found in the
brain.7" Unmetabolized acids destroy myelin, the insulation that al79
lows nerves in the brain to function normally.
In an effort to produce something good from their tragedy, the
Greenbergs recruited Dr. Reuben Matalon in 1987 to research the genetic cause of their children's disease. 80 They contacted other families worldwide to acquire more blood, urine and tissue samples from
other children affected by disease. 1 The Greenbergs also provided
seed money and raised cash to establish a foundation to help fund Dr.
Matalon's research. 2 Dr. Matalon quickly and successfully identified
72. Id. at 445.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 442 (explaining that conception is "the formation in the mind of the
inventor of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is
thereafter to be applied in practice.")
75. See supra note 4.
76. See Reuben Matalon et al., Canavan Disease: From Spongy Degeneration to Molecular
Analysis, 127 J. PEDIATRICS 1995, 511-17; see also Steven Greenhouse, Doctor's Urge Screening
for Disorder,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1999, at F6.
77. See Matthew Hay Brown, Hope in a New Treatment Fora Fatal Genetic Flaw, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 29, 1996, at Sec. 13CN, 1.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See supra note 4.
81. See id.
82. See id

2002]

PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF GENETIC DONORS

269

the gene that caused Canavan Disease, opening up the possibility of
prenatal testing."
In 1991, Dr. Matalon moved his research laboratory to Miami
Children's Hospital Research Institute, bringing his Canavan research
with him. 4 In early 1993, Dr. Matalon announced his success in cloning the gene responsible for Canavan disease. 85 As a result, academic
labs began offering early prenatal testing for the disease based on Dr.
Matalon's papers. 86C Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute
filed a patent application in the fall of 1994 and the institution was
awarded the patent in the fall of 1997, at which point it began restricting use of the test and charging a fee.8 7
After failed attempts at dialogue, the Greenbergs, other parents
and allied groups filed suit against Miami Children's Hospital in Illinois federal court for breach of duty, unjust enrichment, and breach
of informed consent."" Among the concerns they raised was the fear
that research on Canavan disease would be slowed because access to
available information and testing would be severely limited by exorbitant fees. 89 The fees would make it difficult for other interested researchers to do new investigations, and for people who needed
diagnostic testing to get it.0
IV.

EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS AND THE

MEANS

TO PROTECT DONORS

The genetic revolution has created opportunities to improve
human health dramatically, to perform acts of enormous generosity,
and to realize great financial returns on investment.9" The law and
policy in place inadequately address the equity considerations that
emanate from this movement. Informed consent begins to address
issues of fairness and justice by alerting donors to all the interests in a
given research endeavor. Although informed consent is an important
tool for protecting donors, it falls short of addressing the issue of prin83. SeeJustin Gillis, Gene Research Success Spurs Profit Debate,WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2000,
at Al,
41.
84. See id.
85. See Petitioner's Opening Brief at 9, Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital and
Reuben Matalon, No. 00C 6779 (D. Ill. filed Oct. 30, 2000); see also R. Kaul et al., Cloning of
the Human AspartoazcylasecDNA and a Common Missense Mutation in CanavanDisease, 5 NAT.
GENET. at 118-23 (1993).

86. See supra note 4.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See generally Petitioner's Opening Brief, Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital
and Reuben Matalon, No. OOC 6779 (D. Ill. filed Oct. 30, 2000).
90. See id.
91. See generallyJuliaMahoney, The MarketforHuman Tissue, 86 VIR. L. REv. 163 (2000).
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cipled apportionment of the benefits of successful research. Apportioning the benefits of genetic research is a formidable challenge, but
it is imperative that we try to address it.
A.

A Critique of the Patent Regime

The profit potential of raw human genetic material, particularly
diseased genetic material, injects important equity considerations into
a discussion of how the financial and therapeutic benefits derived
from successful research using this material should be apportioned.9 2
As argued below, the individual donors of genetic material and the
aggregate community of donors are entitled to a share in the fruits of
successful research.9 3 These fruits include access to any diagnostic test
or any useful treatment, public and legal acknowledgement of their
contribution, any rights to control that preserve the best interest of
the other patients similarly situated or the public, and of course,
profit.94 Nevertheless, the patent regime does not recognize the contributions of donors.9 5
The Patent and Trademark Office's issuance of patents in this
area, as well as court decisions in such cases as Diamond v. Chakrabarty
and Amgen v. Chugai support the presumption that such patents are
legal.9 6 While genes are products of nature, scientists have convinced
the Patent and Trademark Office, the courts, and, to some extent the
legislature as demonstrated by its inaction, that modifying genes alters
their natural molecular sequence enough such that the result is a
"new composition of matter" that is patentable.9 7 Despite widespread
support, there are compelling arguments to be made against the patentability of gene sequences; 98 however, a comprehensive illustration
of these analyses is beyond the scope of this paper.
On the topic of genetic advances and legal institutions, United
States Supreme CourtJustice Stephen G. Breyer has asserted that judicial decisions need to be grounded in realistic, "not fanciful," predic92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See infra notes 110-57 and accompanying text.
See id.
See id.
See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
See Sheldon Krimsky, The Profit of Scientific Discovery and Its Normative Implications,75

CHI.-KENT L. REv. 15, 23 (1999).

97. See id. at 26.
98. See generally Arthur L. Caplan & Jon Merz, PatentingGene Sequencing: Not in the Best
Interest of Science or Society, 312 BRIT. MED. J. 926 (Apr. 13, 1996);Jon Merz, Diseased Genes Are
Not Patentable,7 CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 425 (1998); Michael A. Heller and

Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research,
239 SCIENCE 698 (May 1, 1998).
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tions of what science will do.99 He asserts that it is imperative that
judges have a sense of the likely social and economic consequences of
their decisions before they act.' 0 0 He has questioned how well the
patent system has responded to the latest developments in genetics:
for instance, does the patenting of naturally occurring genes and disease-causing mutations fulfill the objectives of the patent regime? 0 1
Has it allowed for financial incentives that will "encourage useful discovery and disclosure without unduly restricting the dissemination of
those discoveries, hindering circulation of important scientific ideas,
or scattering ownership to the point where it inhibits use of the underlying genetic advance?""0 2 If not, he posits, "How should the law be
changed?"1" 3 Justice Breyer's questions appear to reflect a willingness
on his part, or perhaps on behalf of the Supreme Court, to entertain
the notion that at least some (if not all) gene sequences should not be
patentable. He reveals his sense that the issue is, at least, ambiguous,
"[c] loning a previously unknown DNA sequence is a little like the 'discovery' of a pre-existing part of the human body, it is also something
like the expensive, time-consuming and novel, isolation of a previously
unknown molecule."'0 4
Justice Breyer's questions reflect some of the criticisms of the patent system in the context of genetic sequences. Answers to these questions have serious implications for donors of genetic material and
patients who could benefit from the advances in diagnostic and treatment options for genetic diseases. Beyond the fact that the patent
regime does not recognize the contributions of specimen donors,
other aspects of patent law have an adverse impact on patient access
to useful diagnostic or treatment options."0 5 For instance, the length
of a patent, which reserves to the holder seventeen to twenty years of
the rights of exclusive use and control, is probably out of line with the
10 6
magnitude of investment and the speed of advances in genetics.

99. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Genetic Advances and Legal Institutions, Remarks at the
'Whitehead Policy Symposium, Plenary Session (May 10, 2000), in 28:4J. OF L. & MED., Dec.
22, 2000 at S23.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See generally American College of Medical Genetics: Position Statement on Gene Patents
and Accessibility of Gene Testing, http//www.faseb.org/genetics/acmg/pol-34.htm (visited
Apr. 8, 2001).
106. Michael S. Watson, Executive Director, American College of Medical Genetics &
ACMG Foundation., address at a forum, Patentability of Gene Sequences, at the University of
Maryland School of Law (Apr. 5, 2001).
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The effect of this is that the monopoly created by a given patent can
limit access to diagnostic testing, as well as further research.' 0 7 Licensing has resulted, in some cases, in exorbitant fees and limitations on
which laboratories are authorized to perform diagnostic testing. 0 8
This in turn reduces or even eliminates competition, causes quality to
10 9
suffer, keeps prices high, and deters innovation.
Further, as the Greenberg case illustrates, the patent system and
the manner in which it is employed by researchers and the biotechnology industry compromises future donor participation in research
because of a deeply felt sense of exploitation. While the patent system
rewards researchers for their discoveries and innovations, there is no
analogous regime that provides an incentive for donors to participate.
Likewise while discoveries and innovations are rigorously protected,
the interests of the research participants are not subject to the same
security. Instead donors are expected to subscribe to an altruistic
scheme in which their "reward" is the feeling of having contributed to
the betterment of the human condition. Only limited rights are associated with that contribution. Clearly, the intersection of the profiteering norms with altruistic norms creates a clash of expectations that
ought to be addressed.
B.

Informed Consent

In his article The Profit of Scientific Discovery and Its Normative Implications, Sheldon Krimsky points out that new financial opportunities
in molecular genetics have a profound effect on the relationship between scientists and their work.' ° Arguably, the new profit motives in
genetic research also have a penetrating effect on the relationship between researchers and doctors, on the one hand, and donors and pa107. See id.
108. See id.; see also Letter from Anna Schissel et al. to the editor, NATURE, Survey Confirms
FearAbout Licensing of Genetic Tests, 402 NATURE 118 (Nov. 11, 1999) (claiming exclusive
rights to several patents are being used to monopolize testing services, or restricting performance of testing services by other labs. Public institutions (including NIH) should not
grant exclusive licenses for "upstream" technologies, particularly when discovered using
public funds. Patents should be available to all. Licensees should be permitted to perform
patented tests non-exclusively and to sublicense to other researchers/labs. Collection of a
reasonable royalty will ensure that the financial rewards and incentives of the patent system
are maintained.); see also Arthur L. Caplan &Jon Merz, PatentingGene Sequencing: Not in the
Best Interest of Science or Society, 312 BaRT. MED. J. 926 (Apr. 13, 1996) (arguing that while
investment is good, limiting access is unlikely to lead to maximal intellectual exploitation
of the resource. If there is not persuasive reason to forbid the patenting of human genes,
the argument must then turn to consequences.)
109. See supra note 102.
110. See Sheldon Krimsky, The Profit of Scientific Discovery and Its Normative Implications, 75
CHI.-KENT L. REv 15, 27 (1999).
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tients, on the other. "Bioprospecting" for new cell lines is infused
with many of the same dangers of exploitation of the body and human
dignity as the Great California Gold Rush, which ravaged land, broke
spirits, decimated populations of indigenous people, and made some
people grossly wealthy. The researching community is walking a very
fine line as it risks alienating the patient population on whom it depends for the raw material at the center of their research. Patients, if
alienated, may refuse to participate in genetic research, fearing
exploitation.
1. Comparing Moore and Greenberg: Similarities
There are fundamental similarities between the Moore case and
the Greenberg case that demonstrate why informed consent is a valuable and necessary tool in protecting the rights and interests of donors
of genetic materials. The Moore case reveals how the disclosure of a
physician's financial interest through informed consent might have
protected the Greenbergs."'
The intersection of the new profiteering model of scientific research with the altruistic model imposed on human tissue donation
creates a disturbing clash between the often aggressive profit goals of
researchers and institutions, on the one hand, and the charitable expectations of donors, on the other. Not-for-profit institutions are no
longer what they appear. Their dependence on profit-making individuals and corporations and their creation of profit-making "spin-offs"
produces great financial complexity. Research, in both the Moore and
Greenberg cases, was done at a not-for profit institution. In both
cases, the donors and their families were aware that academic research was being performed on their cells.11 2 Nevertheless, both
Moore and the Greenbergs were not informed of the researchers' intent to file a patent or that there was the prospect of profit resulting
from the research."1 3 These hidden profit motives suggest some level
of fraud committed against the donors, leaving them feeling misled or
exploited, their expectations violated. Informed consent would put
donors on notice that they could exercise a choice about who should
benefit from their gift.
If researchers were required to disclose profit incentives, donors
would learn of the potential financial value of their donated biological
materials and the researchers' and institutions' intentions to capitalize
111. See infra notes 112-157 and accompanying text.
112. See Moore v. Regents of California, 51 Cal.3d 120, 132 (Cal. 1990); supra note 4.
113. See Moore, 51 Cal.3d at 126-27; supra note 4.
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on their gift. Given that our current public policy does not allow donors of genetic material to realize any profit from their diseased tissue, at the very least they will not be misled as to the beneficiary of
their gratuitous transfer.11 4 This may avert the disturbing clash between altruistic expectations of donors and the aggressive profit-mak1 15
ing goals of researchers and the institutions for whom they work.
Allowing researchers and institutions to convert gifts into profit
transforms the gift. As Lewis Hyde writes, "Gifts are a class of property
whose value lies only in their use and which literally ceases to exist as
gifts if they are not constantly consumed. When gifts are sold, they
change their nature as much as water changes when it freezes, and no
rationalist structure can replace the feeling that is lost.""' 6 Adequate
informed consent should disclose any profit potential to protect individuals from the exploitation inherent in transforming a valuable and
intimate gift into a profit for an unintended beneficiary.
2.

Comparison of Moore and Greenberg: Differences

Individuals and institutions involved in genetic research have
many different goals, which may include: contributing to a diagnosis
or cure of a disease to benefit one's self, contributing to benefit the
health of others, making life-saving and health-saving medical services
available, making a significant profit on an investment of labor or
capital, gaining public recognition, or contributing to the world's
knowledge and understanding of a particular disease."1 7 Examining
the Moore and the Greenberg cases reveals the spectrum of expecta11 8

tions.

First, John Moore sought and received medical treatment for his
20
disease." 9 Research on his cells was incidental to his treatment.1
Although he knew he was participating in academic research, he
stood to benefit, potentially, from the medical treatment he received.
The Greenbergs, on the other hand, actively pursued a researcher
who would study Canavan, not a physician who would treat their children.1 2 The Greenbergs actively participated in supporting the research by raising money to fund it and sought other participants for
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See generally 42 USCA § 274e (West 1987).
See generallyJuliaMahoney, The Marketfor Human Tissue, 86

VIR.

L. REV. 163 (2000).
21 (1983).

LEWIS HYDE, THE GiFT: IMAGINATION AND THE EROTIC LIFE OF PROPERTY

See
See
See
See
See

infra notes 118-132 and accompanying text.
id.
Moore v. Regents of California, 51 Cal.3d 120, 125 (Cal. 1990).
id. at 125-28.
supra note 4.
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the studies. 122 The Greenberg's children who donated specimens expressly for the purpose of research were not likely to benefit from
research done on their cells. 123 Given the short life span of children
with this rare disease, and given that little was known about Canavan
disease, their participation would likely benefit only people other than
themselves. 124 However, the Greenbergs were able to conceive two
children who were not afflicted with Canavan disease because of the
predictive testing that resulted from research.12 5
Second, the researchers in the Moore case developed their cell
line from John Moore's cells exclusively, not from an aggregation of
many donor cells. 12 6 While researchers had learned much about hairy
cell leukemia from studying cells other than John Moore's cells, his
cells were of great value to them because they overproduced certain
proteins that had potential therapeutic value.1 27 It is unusual that the
cells from one individual would be the exclusive source for a cell line
used in diagnosis and treatment of a particular disease. More often,
information is aggregated from many individuals and leads to the development of a genetic probe that can be used to detect genetic mutations. This was the case with the Canavan research, which developed
its cell line from several individuals. In addition, therapeutic value was
less certain at the early stage in research on Canavan disease.
Third, Moore's hairy cell leukemia is more common than
Canavan disease. This difference most likely has an impact on the respective patent holders' expectations for a profitable return on their
discovery. The potential market for the Moore cell line was predicted
to be as high as three billion dollars. 12 No predictions are available
for the Canavan discovery.
Finally, Moore's doctor assisted the Regents of California in developing the commercial value of the cell line and any products derived from it. 1 29 A private biotechnology company, Genetics Institute
(G.I.), was given exclusive access to the materials and research performed. 3 ° Consequently, Moore's doctor became a paid consultant
to G.I., acquired rights to G.I. stock, and received other payments and
122.
123.
124.
125.
at Al.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See id.
See id.
See supra note 4.
SeeJustin Gillis, Gene Research Success Spurs Profit Debate, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2000,
See Moore v. Regents of California, 51 Cal.3d 120, 127 n.2 (Cal. 1990).
Id.
See id. at 127.
See id.
See id.
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fringe benefits from the company.1"' The Greenbergs' researcher, on
the other hand, claims to have received no financial benefits from his
discovery, even though Miami Children's Hospital has attempted to
move ahead with finding a company to which it would give exclusive
licensing rights.11

3.

2

The Apportionment Dilemma

The current regime of allocating the duties, rights and entitlements associated with the use of human biological materials is inadequate."' 3 In designing a better system of apportionment, we need to
examine the rationale for our current public policy that disallows a
donor, the human repository of valuable cells, from realizing any
profit and allows only very limited control of those tissues. The policy
seems to be contradicted by the fact that commerce plays a central
role in the distribution and allocation of human biological material,
which may be exploited for its financial value once it has been taken
13 4
from the donor and stored in a secondary repository.
Current public policy limiting donor rights' emerges from concerns that granting individuals property rights in their own tissue will
commodify the human body.' 3 5 Also, offering compensation may
lead to exploitation of the poor who may be willing to assume great
health risks for payment. 13 6 In their book Body Bazaar, Lori Andrews
and Dorothy Nelkin introduce the prospect that giving people property rights in their own tissue will prompt other people to treat it as
property. 1 7 They raise the specter of chilling possibilities: a man is
denied welfare because his kidney is worth $20,000; a woman is denied a student loan because her eggs are worth $2,000 to $50,000; a
comatose woman's eggs are harvested to pay for her hospital bill.'3 8
And finally, allowing donors property interests in their own tissue may
serve as a disincentive to researchers to do such research.
Nevertheless, commerce already plays a central role in the allocation of human biological materials; human biological materials have
131. See id.
132. See generally Justin Gillis, Gene Research Success Spurs Profit Debate, WASH. POST, Dec.
30, 2000, at Al.
133. See generally Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissues, 86 VA. L. REv. 163

(2000).
134.
135.
136.
137.
IN

See id. at 165.
See id.
See id.
See LoRi ANDREWS & DORTHY NELKIN, BODY BAZAAR:
THE BIOTECHNOLOGY AGE 165 (2001).
138. See id.
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been commodified.' 39 Body parts are bought and sold throughout the
medical industry, once they have been donated; property rights in
body parts vest only in secondary individuals and institutions though,
not the original donor.14 ° In tort suits, the court is authorized to compensate individuals for the value of a severe injury, considering a variety of factors in the calculus (for example: earning potential, lost
opportunity, life expectancy)."' Athletes and models are compensated for physical attributes. Tina Turner can insure her legs for two
million dollars. 4 2 Robert Parker, the famous wine critic, can insure
his taste buds for one million dollars.14 The images of famous people
are awarded property status.' 4 4
It is easy to understand how property rights serve as an incentive
for researchers and institutions to do work that will prove commercially successful. Medical options that improve health clearly have
commercial value. Conceding these points, though, does not support
the argument that individuals should be denied property interests in
their own tissue. In fact, one could argue that a similar incentive system would be effective in encouraging more people to participate in
research. By acknowledging an individual's property interest in
human biological materials, we may be better able to protect the
rights and interests of donors. Precluding individuals from access to
the same or similar incentive system has the potential to alienate people from participating in valuable research because of the perception
that they may be exploited.
In addition, the point can be made that value already exists in the
raw human biological materials before they are submitted to any scientific processes. Consider the following hypothetical: An individual
owns a rock embedded with sapphires. Clearly, this person owns something of value, though admittedly, the value of the sapphires will increase if they are extracted, cut into gems, and perhaps mounted in a
setting. The process, which the individual who owns the rock does not
have the skill to perform, adds more value to the stones. Nevertheless,
the process does not spontaneously create the value.
139. See generally Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissues, 86 VA. L. REv. 163

(2000).
140. See generally ANDREWS supra note 137.
141. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 873-74, 882-83,
482-88 (6th ed. Aspen Law & Business Panel Publishers 1995).
142. See Erica Garcia, Insure This http://www.business2.com/articles/mag/
0,1640,10385,FF.html (visited Nov. 23, 2001).
143. See John Vankat, Straight Talk About Wine, http://www.winepocketlist.com/columns/whoisexpert.html (visited Nov. 23, 2001).
144. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
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While apportioning the benefits of research presents a significant
challenge, certain goals ought to be met. First, researchers and their
funding institutions should be reimbursed for most of their expenses
associated with the research. Second, the researcher and/or the funding institution should be able to receive some percentage of any
money received in excess of recouped expenses as an incentive to do
further research. After this, the criteria for an apportionment scheme
become harder to define. One patient advocacy group has attempted
to develop such a scheme through its foundation, PXE International,
Inc., including a private agreement between and collaborative efforts
of PXE International and the researchers at the University of
Hawaii. 145

C.

GrassrootsAdvocacy: A CollaborativeModel

Sharon and Patrick Terry established a foundation, PXE International, Inc., after discovering that two of their children had a genetic
disease called pseudoxanthoma elasticum, a disease that causes the
connective tissue in the skin, eyes, and arteries to calcify.14 6 The foundation serves as a repository to store blood and tissue samples of individuals with the disease, and in addition, raises money to fund
research on the disease.14 7 To protect their donors' interests, PXE
required that researchers who wanted to use samples from their repository agree to joint possession of any intellectual property rights,
shared profits resulting from any discoveries. PXE also required that
any genetic test that were developed be made available to the foundation. 1 48 Researchers at the University of Hawaii agreed to PXE's stipulations and used the specimens in the PXE repository to isolate the
gene responsible for the disease. 149 In an unprecedented move, PXE
and the University filed ajoint patent application.'
Both the University and the donor advocacy group seem to have similar goals in mind:
that the tests and treatments be widely accessible and available at an
affordable price.
Given that the courts have held that people cannot contract for
things to which they are not entitled,'' the agreement between PXE
145. See infra notes 146-57 and accompanying text.
146. See Paul Smaglik, Tissue Donors Use Their Influence in Deal Over Gene Patent Terms, 401
NATURE 821 (Oct. 19, 2000); see generally www.pxe.org (last visited Nov. 20, 2001).
147. See Gina Kolata, Sharing Profits Is Debated As the Value of Tissue Rises, N.Y. TIMES, May
15, 2000, at Al.
148. See supra note 146.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
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and researcher at the University of Hawaii may not withstand the scrube a
tiny of the Patent Trademark Office. As in Brown, PXE may not
t5 2
co-inventor within the statutory requirements for conception.
PXE International serves an important function for potential donors. Universities, such as the University of California, and some hospitals, such as Miami Children's Hospital, are no longer
unambiguously not-for-profit institutions. PXE International on the
other hand, is clearly a not-for-profit foundation, which acts with the
best interest of individuals who have pseudoxanthoma elasticum. Understanding the forces at play in the genetic revolution is essential to
being able to mobilize resources to protect donors' interests and
rights, and balance competing interests.
It is interesting to note that the PXE International's blood donation informed consent form does not disclose that a patent application has been filed.' 5 ' Under "financial considerations" the form
explains that a donor is not charged, nor does he/she receive payment for participating in the research.' 5 4 It behooves the foundation
to reveal that a patent application has been filed on the informed
consent form. Donors should be informed not only that therapeutic
benefit may be derived from their donations, but also that the pending patent application, if successful, will result in financial benefit to
those named on the patent. Donors should be able to control who
will derive any financial benefit resulting from their donations.
In October of 1999, the Alliance of Genetic Support Groups and
the American Society of Human Genetics Ad Hoc Committee on Consumer Issues delivered a consensus statement recognizing the important role genetic support groups play in the research of genetic
diseases. 1 55 But not everyone agrees that patient advocacy groups
152. See Brown v. Regents of the University of California, 866 F. Supp. 439, 440 (N. Dist.
Cal. 1994).
153. See the PXE informed consent form (describing what will happen with blood samples: "Blood will be used in research projects that isolate the gene(s) for pseudoxanthoma
elasticum and its mutations, and which have been approved by PXE International." It also
describes benefits: "There is no direct benefit to the blood donor, but the hope of the
foundation is that information gained from the bank will help in the treatment of pseudoxanthoma elasticum." (on file with the author).
154. Id.
155. Genetic Alliance statement of position on collaborative research at http://www.
geneticalliance.org/aboutus/researchmodel.html, (visited Apr. 4, 2001). The statement
reads as follows:
Research in Human Genetics is a shared enterprise that involves investigators, subjects, and ancillary agencies, including funding organization and regulatory boards. The cultures of these groups often differ and these differences create
a dynamic tension between shared and divergent interests. When divergent interests interfere with recruitment of subjects to research and compromise mutual
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have a role in balancing the competing interests that emerge in the
context of the research. Some believe that if tissue donors demand

any control over the results of research or a cut of the profits, "a long
standing and noble tradition in this country of voluntary and charitable donations to medical research" will be undermined.1 56 In addition, donors could influence the design of studies and the direction of
research to the detriment of the greater good. 1 57 Balancing competing interests in the context of genetic research is a complex and challenging undertaking; the profit potential has changed the scientific
paradigm and donors' relationship to it. As a result and for lack of a
better alternative, patient advocacy groups are an essential mechanism
for protecting donors' interests and rights.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Greenberg case represents a compelling reason to expand
informed consent to include profit incentive in the disclosures researchers and institutions must make before proceeding with their investigations. Their case also presents an opportunity to delve more
deeply into how we should apportion the therapeutic and financial
benefits resulting from successful research. The patent system and
public policy do not sufficiently address the problems inherent in exchanges between donors of genetic material and researchers. As the
Greenberg and Moore case, illustrate, the current system threatens to
alienate potential donors from the research process. There is an urunderstanding of goals of both parties, it is important to identify mechanisms to
create or recognize these shared goals. Genetic support groups are an important
agency in this enterprise. These groups have diverse objectives: creation of community, advancement of education for members and professional and sponsorship and encouragement of research. To the extent that successful support
groups have created active involvement in research, their activities provide models for future collaborative relationships. The key activities at the level of support
groups include education of members about expectations for research, elements
of the consent process, and the nature of research as well as education of investigators with respect to many of these same elements. Support groups can best
broker the successful relationships between investigators and participants where
the cultural differences are clearly delineated. As the Human Genome Project
reaches its objective of a complete sequence and the emphasis in Human Genetics research evolves from gene finding to characterization of disease mechanisms,
the role of support groups in recruitment of subjects will be increasingly important. The change, i.e., to search for successful therapies, will require an even
more active interaction of investigators, subjects, support groups, and other agencies to recruit the participants and to explain the objectives of the research process. Active collaboration among investigators, subjects, and support groups will
be the catalyst for future research productivity in human genetic disorders.
156. Matt Fleischer, Patent Thyself THE AMERICAN LAWYER, June 2001, at 87.
157. See id.
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gent need to design and implement new legal and policy regimes that

better regulate the commerce of human biological materials. Doing
so will promote human health and reward the generosity of the
human spirit.
ANNE NICHOLS HILL

